Politics Thread (encompassing Brexit) - 21 June 2017 onwards

[leicsmac]

2 hours ago, Salisbury Fox said:

So do I, but unfortunately I can't see anything changing soon given the planet's diminishing resources, population increases, unpredictable extreme weather and the number of despotic regimes around the world.

 

We need a new planet to mess up quick 

 

 

Bloody right we do. As well as sorting out some kind of sustainability on this one.

[Alf Bentley]

I see Princess Meghan is up the duff, due in the spring.

 

If it's a difficult birth, they should call the baby Brexit. 

[Guest MattP]

Good read from the ST about the rise of "populism".

Why is populism on the rise? How Brexit and Donald Trump gained support

It’s not the refuge of old white male racists. Trump and Brexit have plenty of young and affluent supporters, and they’re here to stay. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin demolish the myths peddled by comfortable elites

 

Myths about national populism are flourishing. From the US to Europe, populist movements are seen as a refuge for irrational bigots, jobless losers, Rust Belt rejects, voters who were hit hard by the great recession and angry old white men who will soon die and be replaced by tolerant millennials. In the shadow of Trump, Brexit and the rise of national populism in Europe, countless writers drew a straight line to an alienated white underclass in America’s industrial heartlands, angry pensioners in England’s fading seaside resorts and the unemployed in Europe’s wastelands.

 

People tend to reduce complex movements to one type of voter or to one cause because they want simple and straightforward explanations. But when more than 62m people voted for Trump, more than 17m for Brexit, more than 10m for Marine Le Pen and nearly 6m for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the idea that national-populist movements can be reduced to simplistic stereotypes is ridiculous. It also has real implications: misdiagnosing the roots of their support will in the long run make it harder for their opponents to get back into the game.

National populism is an ideology rooted in deep currents that have been swirling beneath our democracies and gaining strength over many decades. Its proponents prioritise the culture and interests of the nation, and promise to give voice to a people who feel they have been neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often corrupt elites.

Foremost among the myths is the idea that national populism is almost exclusively powered by the unemployed and people on low incomes or in poverty. While there is variation from country to country, national populism has cast its net surprisingly widely across society, scooping up votes from full-time workers, middle-class conservatives, the self-employed, people on average or high incomes and even the young.

The tendency to portray Trump as a refuge for poverty-stricken whites, for instance, is deeply problematic. During the US primaries, the median household income of a Trump voter was $72,000, compared with a national median of $56,000. The dominant findings from nearly every study that has so far been done on Trump’s electorate are clear: attitudes to race, gender and cultural change played a big role, while objective economic circumstances played only a limited role.

Or look at Brexit. Some traced the shock result to dire economic conditions, even though the vote occurred as Britain’s unemployment neared its lowest rate since the 1970s. The idea of ending Britain’s EU membership was certainly popular among people on low incomes, but even among those who lived on average or just-above-average incomes support for Brexit was 51%. Britain’s departure was cheered on in struggling industrial towns, but it was also celebrated in affluent Conservative counties.

 

Another popular myth is that all this turbulence is rooted in the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, the great recession and the austerity that was subsequently imposed on democracies in Europe. Seen from this point of view, national populism is driven by the financially disadvantaged who were battered by the post-2008 economic storm. Economists traced what they called “Brexit-Trump syndrome” to unregulated markets, harsh public-spending cuts and a loss of faith in economic orthodoxy. In their words: “It’s the economics, stupid.”

 

There is no doubt that the financial crisis created more room for national populists. Aside from exacerbating divides among voters, it contributed to a loss of support for traditional parties and record levels of political volatility in Europe, where people became much more willing to switch their allegiance from one election to the next. But the notion that it is the primary cause is not convincing at all. If all you needed was a crisis, then why did past crises, such as the oil-price shocks of the 1970s, not produce a similar reaction? And how can we explain the fact that the revolt against liberal democracy began long before the collapse of Lehman Brothers?

It was actually in the 1980s that the most significant national populists in postwar Europe showed up. They included Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Jörg Haider in Austria, who emerged while promising to slash immigration, strengthen law and order and take on a “corrupt” establishment. In Britain, although many writers would later trace Brexit to post-crisis austerity, they forget that it was back in 2004 that Nigel Farage and Ukip enjoyed their first big success, after 48 consecutive quarters of economic expansion.

 

A second myth is that national-populist support comes entirely from old white men who will soon die. This is a comfortable narrative for liberals because it implies that they do not need to engage with any of its ideas. Rather, they just need to wait for pensioners to slip over the horizon, at which point socially liberal millennials will take over, while the West’s populations become ever more diverse. This view has won support from the Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh, who argued that Brexit was “as good as things will get for traditional conservatives” because over time their support would be eroded by generational change.

 

Such voices point to big differences in outlook between the young and old. In 2018, for example, while 65% of pensioners thought Brexit had been the right decision, 68% of those aged 18-24 thought it had been wrong. But liberals routinely exaggerate both the pace and scale of generational change. They gloss over the fact that, while the young generally tend to be less racist, quite a few of them are instinctively receptive to national populism.

Beneath these broad brushstrokes lies the fact that Brexit was endorsed by one in four British graduates, one in two women, one in two people from urban areas, around two-fifths of those aged between 18 and 34 and half of those aged between 35 and 44.

Brexit was also dismissed by senior liberal politicians such as Vince Cable as a vote by people who longed for a world where “faces were white” and the map of the world was “coloured imperial pink”. But this caricature does not sit easily with the fact that Brexit was supported by one in three black and ethnic-minority voters, some of whom felt that Britain’s liberal immigration policy was giving preferential treatment to immigrants from inside Europe at the expense of those from outside Europe, or who themselves felt anxious about the historically unprecedented rates of immigration that had taken place in the decade before the referendum. This non-white support was visible in cities and towns such as Birmingham, Bradford, Luton and Slough.

 

The age profile of these supporters also pushes back strongly against the narrative of angry old men. In Italy the national-populist League movement has drawn its support fairly evenly across the generations, while in France, Marine Le Pen won over more people aged 18-34 than any other candidate in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. In Germany, AfD appeals most strongly not to old pensioners with distant memories of Hitler, but to people aged 25-50, who have no direct connection to the Nazi era.

In the US, no less than 41% of white millennials turned out for Trump; they worked full-time and were actually less likely than those who did not back Trump to be on low incomes. Contrary to the claim that the young are not bothered by issues such as immigration, these younger Americans were especially anxious about “white vulnerability” — the perception that whites, through no fault of their own, are losing ground to others in society. A poll in Britain last spring revealed that 41% of 18- to 24-year-olds and 58% of 25- to 49-year-olds felt that immigration was “too high”.

 

This brings us to one of the big fault lines that run through western society: the educational divide. Debates about national populism often focus heavily on income and jobs, but education is actually far more important. Whereas 80% of Brits under 34 with a degree voted for Britain to remain in the EU, only 37% of their peers without a degree did the same.

 

A further popular myth is that the people who support Trump, Brexit or the likes of Le Pen are voting against the system rather than for the national populists. This “protest theory” is popular because many writers, particularly those on the liberal left, struggle with the idea that people might actually want things such as lower immigration, stronger borders, fewer welfare benefits for recent immigrants who have not paid tax over the years and more powers returned from distant transnational institutions to the nation state.

Yet when eight in ten of Trump’s voters supported his idea of building a wall on America’s border with Mexico, or when three in four Brexit voters, worried about how immigration was changing their country, voted for the offer to “take back control”, it is hard to accept that they did not know what they were voting for, or that they were just protesting against the Establishment. Certainly, many loathe established politicians, but they are also endorsing the message — they are voting for it because they want it.

Most people in the West are not giving up on democracy, although many are open to more “direct” forms of democracy that would give people a greater say in the decisions that affect their daily lives. But there is clear and overwhelming evidence of a rising tide of distrust and a strong belief among many voters that they are no longer even in the conversation. Among Brits who felt they were being listened to, the vote for Brexit was only 37%; but among those who felt that politicians “do not listen to people like me” it spiralled to 58%.

 

Both the Trump campaign and Brexit also tapped into a second concern about relative deprivation — a sense that the wider group, whether white Americans or native Britons, is being left behind relative to others in society, while culturally liberal politicians, media and celebrities devote far more attention and status to immigrants, ethnic minorities and other newcomers.

This sense of relative deprivation is absolutely central to national populism. It acts as a bridge between culture and economics. It is intimately bound up with people’s worries about the broader economic and social position of their wider group and how this compares with others in society. But it is also linked closely to people’s specific concerns about how they feel that immigrants, ethnic minorities and rapid ethnic change are threatening their group, not only economically but also socially and culturally. They worry: will their identity and ways of life fall further behind and perhaps eventually be destroyed for ever?

 

Such fears are not always grounded in objective reality, but they are still potent. In Britain, many leavers saw the Brexit referendum as a prime opportunity to voice their strong concerns about how immigration was changing the nation — concerns which had increased with the historically unprecedented flows of immigrants into Britain from the early 2000s onwards.

 

People who felt anxious about it were not only more likely to vote “leave”; they were also more likely to bother to turn out and vote. Remainers talked endlessly about economic risks while leavers were chiefly concerned about perceived threats to their identity and national group.

 

So strong was the desire among leavers to chart a different path that six in ten said that significant damage to the British economy would be a “price worth paying for Brexit”, while four in ten were willing to see themselves or their relatives lose their jobs if it meant that Brexit was delivered. The anti-Brexit remain strategists handled this badly. By deciding to completely avoid the immigration issue they sent voters a signal that “the elite” had no real interest in taking their concerns seriously.

Were we still in an era when their bonds with the people remained strong and robust, the traditional parties might have been able to fend off these challenges. But the classic era of the early-to-mid 20th century, when political allegiances were more stable and the dividing lines of politics fixed, has ended.

 

Trump, Brexit and national populists in Europe are by no means identical. There will always be differences from one country to another, as there are in all “political families”. But one point that has recurred throughout is that people who support national populism are not merely protesting: they are choosing to endorse views that appeal to them. And this revolt will not be disappearing any time soon.

 

Populism in numbers

41% The proportion of white millennials who voted for Donald Trump in 2016

$72k The median household income of Trump voters. The national average is $56,000

58% The proportion of Britons aged 25-49 who think immigration is “too high”

 

[leicsmac]

Interesting article, and a good summarisation.

 

Would have been nice to see more from the writer about their perception of the consequences of such populism and what they make of it, though - an analysis of it all is good but where things go from here is the real meat of the matter.

[Nick]

On 14 October 2018 at 16:33, MattP said:

My bad. I saw this and posted with no research

I thought you were joking!  

[leicsmac]

I See You with yet another absolute corker, this time aimed at events in Saudi Arabia:

 

"I see you, Mohammed bin Salman.

 

I see the carefully presented face you show to the world, a youthful and clean-cut future for a House of Saud looking to make its mark on the 21st Century. I see you on your business trips and PR exercises, a modern playboy from an ultraconservative nation with pockets deeper than Felix’s magic bag. Saudi Arabia is going to spend its way into global acceptance under your stewardship, riding the wave of such incredible PR coups as ‘women can drive now’ and ‘don’t look at the beheadings, look at the shiny gold coins.’

 

If there’s a ceiling on the heights of grotesque excess and tastelessness, you’d probably gild it and stick it on Instagram. You’ve thrown money at any token ‘progressive’ gesture you can make, the rank hypocrisy of it all so brazen that it dazzles and blinds those you’re handing the cash to. You’re bringing the WWE to Saudi Arabia with so much money that it’s enough to drag Shawn Michaels out of retirement, despite the fact he’s now more pacemaker than Heartbreak Kid and has to use an ear trumpet to hear his own sweet chin music. You’ll put on shows so grandiose that they're heralded around the world, but just for the boys. Charlotte Flair can hang up her gear and stay at home like the infidel slut she is, because there’s nothing more disgusting than a woman pretending to hit another woman. Everyone knows women should only work as housekeepers, where they can get hit for real by the minor royals that employ them. Isn’t that right, Mohammed bin Salman?

 

The money is as dodgy as it is excessive, and the human rights abuses so grotesque that they lay waste to the lies about modernising Saudi Arabia’s vision for the Arab world. Justin Trudeau can pop his little head above the parapet to criticise you and you’ll put him on full blast like the pussywhipped tofu beta cuck he is. Money talks louder than anything else, and now Trump has laid his tiny hands on your swollen glowing ball for all the world to see there's nothing you can't do.

 

You’ll give them driving licences with one hand and sweep them into prisons for protesting with the other. You’ll buy arms and pulverise Yemen, safe in the knowledge that you’re the West’s bulwark against Iran, even as you fund mosques and extremist preachers that sell hate to children. It’s a region so full of bad actors that it’s practically an episode of Hollyoaks and there’s not a hand to shake that isn’t drenched in blood and attached to a hypocrite. There’s not a mark you can overstep, is there, Mohammed bin Salman?

 

It’s looking pretty unlikely that Jamal Khashoggi is still frantically banging on a toilet door in the consulate because the handle’s fallen off. If he has been murdered, it’s been ordered at the highest levels and Saudi Arabia has chosen to shit on its own doorstep because it is completely unfazed at the prospect of an international backlash. Now the possibility of one is looming you’re not happy, are you, Mohammed bin Salman? Before your country’s guilt has even been proven you’re threatening an escalating response to the possibility of sanctions, clutching the strings on the oil-stained purse.

 

The twist? The twist is that the world is so morally bankrupt that it will probably work. There’s no conscience involved, no sense of basic decency when there is money to be made. Saudi Arabia exists in a region that requires constant jostling for position, and sticking to points of moral principle means ceding your ground to an enemy. The West may have leaders that pay lip service to the notions of human rights and the freedom of democracy, but they’ll sign the arms deals regardless and take the money over the corpses. The stranglehold of oil could easily be broken by investment in renewables and if Trump or anyone else had the courage to call Saudi Arabia out on arrogantly overplaying their hand, it would happen. But blood isn’t thicker than oil, and one will continue to run across the land while the other pumps through the poisonous arteries that we lay below her surface.

 

It’s as insidious as it is toxic, and its black and never-ending flow will submerge the moderates, the innocent and the dissidents. Jamal Khashoggi had a vision for the future too, and you drowned it in the flood.

 

I see you, Mohammed bin Salman. I ****ing see you."

 

Chillingly perfect. One line in particular stands out - "sticking to points of moral principle means ceding your ground to an enemy".

Edited 16 October 2018 by leicsmac

[purpleronnie]

20 hours ago, MattP said:

Good read from the ST about the rise of "populism".

Why is populism on the rise? How Brexit and Donald Trump gained support

It’s not the refuge of old white male racists. Trump and Brexit have plenty of young and affluent supporters, and they’re here to stay. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin demolish the myths peddled by comfortable elites

 

Myths about national populism are flourishing. From the US to Europe, populist movements are seen as a refuge for irrational bigots, jobless losers, Rust Belt rejects, voters who were hit hard by the great recession and angry old white men who will soon die and be replaced by tolerant millennials. In the shadow of Trump, Brexit and the rise of national populism in Europe, countless writers drew a straight line to an alienated white underclass in America’s industrial heartlands, angry pensioners in England’s fading seaside resorts and the unemployed in Europe’s wastelands.

 

People tend to reduce complex movements to one type of voter or to one cause because they want simple and straightforward explanations. But when more than 62m people voted for Trump, more than 17m for Brexit, more than 10m for Marine Le Pen and nearly 6m for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the idea that national-populist movements can be reduced to simplistic stereotypes is ridiculous. It also has real implications: misdiagnosing the roots of their support will in the long run make it harder for their opponents to get back into the game.

National populism is an ideology rooted in deep currents that have been swirling beneath our democracies and gaining strength over many decades. Its proponents prioritise the culture and interests of the nation, and promise to give voice to a people who feel they have been neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often corrupt elites.

Foremost among the myths is the idea that national populism is almost exclusively powered by the unemployed and people on low incomes or in poverty. While there is variation from country to country, national populism has cast its net surprisingly widely across society, scooping up votes from full-time workers, middle-class conservatives, the self-employed, people on average or high incomes and even the young.

The tendency to portray Trump as a refuge for poverty-stricken whites, for instance, is deeply problematic. During the US primaries, the median household income of a Trump voter was $72,000, compared with a national median of $56,000. The dominant findings from nearly every study that has so far been done on Trump’s electorate are clear: attitudes to race, gender and cultural change played a big role, while objective economic circumstances played only a limited role.

Or look at Brexit. Some traced the shock result to dire economic conditions, even though the vote occurred as Britain’s unemployment neared its lowest rate since the 1970s. The idea of ending Britain’s EU membership was certainly popular among people on low incomes, but even among those who lived on average or just-above-average incomes support for Brexit was 51%. Britain’s departure was cheered on in struggling industrial towns, but it was also celebrated in affluent Conservative counties.

 

Another popular myth is that all this turbulence is rooted in the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, the great recession and the austerity that was subsequently imposed on democracies in Europe. Seen from this point of view, national populism is driven by the financially disadvantaged who were battered by the post-2008 economic storm. Economists traced what they called “Brexit-Trump syndrome” to unregulated markets, harsh public-spending cuts and a loss of faith in economic orthodoxy. In their words: “It’s the economics, stupid.”

 

There is no doubt that the financial crisis created more room for national populists. Aside from exacerbating divides among voters, it contributed to a loss of support for traditional parties and record levels of political volatility in Europe, where people became much more willing to switch their allegiance from one election to the next. But the notion that it is the primary cause is not convincing at all. If all you needed was a crisis, then why did past crises, such as the oil-price shocks of the 1970s, not produce a similar reaction? And how can we explain the fact that the revolt against liberal democracy began long before the collapse of Lehman Brothers?

It was actually in the 1980s that the most significant national populists in postwar Europe showed up. They included Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Jörg Haider in Austria, who emerged while promising to slash immigration, strengthen law and order and take on a “corrupt” establishment. In Britain, although many writers would later trace Brexit to post-crisis austerity, they forget that it was back in 2004 that Nigel Farage and Ukip enjoyed their first big success, after 48 consecutive quarters of economic expansion.

 

A second myth is that national-populist support comes entirely from old white men who will soon die. This is a comfortable narrative for liberals because it implies that they do not need to engage with any of its ideas. Rather, they just need to wait for pensioners to slip over the horizon, at which point socially liberal millennials will take over, while the West’s populations become ever more diverse. This view has won support from the Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh, who argued that Brexit was “as good as things will get for traditional conservatives” because over time their support would be eroded by generational change.

 

Such voices point to big differences in outlook between the young and old. In 2018, for example, while 65% of pensioners thought Brexit had been the right decision, 68% of those aged 18-24 thought it had been wrong. But liberals routinely exaggerate both the pace and scale of generational change. They gloss over the fact that, while the young generally tend to be less racist, quite a few of them are instinctively receptive to national populism.

Beneath these broad brushstrokes lies the fact that Brexit was endorsed by one in four British graduates, one in two women, one in two people from urban areas, around two-fifths of those aged between 18 and 34 and half of those aged between 35 and 44.

Brexit was also dismissed by senior liberal politicians such as Vince Cable as a vote by people who longed for a world where “faces were white” and the map of the world was “coloured imperial pink”. But this caricature does not sit easily with the fact that Brexit was supported by one in three black and ethnic-minority voters, some of whom felt that Britain’s liberal immigration policy was giving preferential treatment to immigrants from inside Europe at the expense of those from outside Europe, or who themselves felt anxious about the historically unprecedented rates of immigration that had taken place in the decade before the referendum. This non-white support was visible in cities and towns such as Birmingham, Bradford, Luton and Slough.

 

The age profile of these supporters also pushes back strongly against the narrative of angry old men. In Italy the national-populist League movement has drawn its support fairly evenly across the generations, while in France, Marine Le Pen won over more people aged 18-34 than any other candidate in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. In Germany, AfD appeals most strongly not to old pensioners with distant memories of Hitler, but to people aged 25-50, who have no direct connection to the Nazi era.

In the US, no less than 41% of white millennials turned out for Trump; they worked full-time and were actually less likely than those who did not back Trump to be on low incomes. Contrary to the claim that the young are not bothered by issues such as immigration, these younger Americans were especially anxious about “white vulnerability” — the perception that whites, through no fault of their own, are losing ground to others in society. A poll in Britain last spring revealed that 41% of 18- to 24-year-olds and 58% of 25- to 49-year-olds felt that immigration was “too high”.

 

This brings us to one of the big fault lines that run through western society: the educational divide. Debates about national populism often focus heavily on income and jobs, but education is actually far more important. Whereas 80% of Brits under 34 with a degree voted for Britain to remain in the EU, only 37% of their peers without a degree did the same.

 

A further popular myth is that the people who support Trump, Brexit or the likes of Le Pen are voting against the system rather than for the national populists. This “protest theory” is popular because many writers, particularly those on the liberal left, struggle with the idea that people might actually want things such as lower immigration, stronger borders, fewer welfare benefits for recent immigrants who have not paid tax over the years and more powers returned from distant transnational institutions to the nation state.

Yet when eight in ten of Trump’s voters supported his idea of building a wall on America’s border with Mexico, or when three in four Brexit voters, worried about how immigration was changing their country, voted for the offer to “take back control”, it is hard to accept that they did not know what they were voting for, or that they were just protesting against the Establishment. Certainly, many loathe established politicians, but they are also endorsing the message — they are voting for it because they want it.

Most people in the West are not giving up on democracy, although many are open to more “direct” forms of democracy that would give people a greater say in the decisions that affect their daily lives. But there is clear and overwhelming evidence of a rising tide of distrust and a strong belief among many voters that they are no longer even in the conversation. Among Brits who felt they were being listened to, the vote for Brexit was only 37%; but among those who felt that politicians “do not listen to people like me” it spiralled to 58%.

 

Both the Trump campaign and Brexit also tapped into a second concern about relative deprivation — a sense that the wider group, whether white Americans or native Britons, is being left behind relative to others in society, while culturally liberal politicians, media and celebrities devote far more attention and status to immigrants, ethnic minorities and other newcomers.

This sense of relative deprivation is absolutely central to national populism. It acts as a bridge between culture and economics. It is intimately bound up with people’s worries about the broader economic and social position of their wider group and how this compares with others in society. But it is also linked closely to people’s specific concerns about how they feel that immigrants, ethnic minorities and rapid ethnic change are threatening their group, not only economically but also socially and culturally. They worry: will their identity and ways of life fall further behind and perhaps eventually be destroyed for ever?

 

Such fears are not always grounded in objective reality, but they are still potent. In Britain, many leavers saw the Brexit referendum as a prime opportunity to voice their strong concerns about how immigration was changing the nation — concerns which had increased with the historically unprecedented flows of immigrants into Britain from the early 2000s onwards.

 

People who felt anxious about it were not only more likely to vote “leave”; they were also more likely to bother to turn out and vote. Remainers talked endlessly about economic risks while leavers were chiefly concerned about perceived threats to their identity and national group.

 

So strong was the desire among leavers to chart a different path that six in ten said that significant damage to the British economy would be a “price worth paying for Brexit”, while four in ten were willing to see themselves or their relatives lose their jobs if it meant that Brexit was delivered. The anti-Brexit remain strategists handled this badly. By deciding to completely avoid the immigration issue they sent voters a signal that “the elite” had no real interest in taking their concerns seriously.

Were we still in an era when their bonds with the people remained strong and robust, the traditional parties might have been able to fend off these challenges. But the classic era of the early-to-mid 20th century, when political allegiances were more stable and the dividing lines of politics fixed, has ended.

 

Trump, Brexit and national populists in Europe are by no means identical. There will always be differences from one country to another, as there are in all “political families”. But one point that has recurred throughout is that people who support national populism are not merely protesting: they are choosing to endorse views that appeal to them. And this revolt will not be disappearing any time soon.

 

Populism in numbers

41% The proportion of white millennials who voted for Donald Trump in 2016

$72k The median household income of Trump voters. The national average is $56,000

58% The proportion of Britons aged 25-49 who think immigration is “too high”

 

Funny how people who write these or post these only tend to do it to try and defend their own view yet do it under the pretence of creating a balanced view.

 

But maybe they'll also write or post about the 'myth' of generation snowflake or that middle class lefties are just champagne socialists or that remainers aren't patriotic enough.....doubt it though.

 

If people assume that because they voted Brexit or for Trump that people view them as racist then maybe their the ones that are snowflakes. 

 

As for all the FACTS about polls, funny how most dismiss them when its not in their favour but are quite happy to post them when they are.

 

And here's the proof of that statement, there was a poll that stated 70% on 18-34 year olds put immigration BOTTOM of a list of 22 different concerns.  We call all find polls to back up our point, so what good are they when trying to prove a point?

 

Reality is both the left and the right are stuck in these polarizing myths unable to see past them, and that's the real problem.

[Strokes]

48 minutes ago, purpleronnie said:

Funny how people who write these or post these only tend to do it to try and defend their own view yet do it under the pretence of creating a balanced view.

 

But maybe they'll also write or post about the 'myth' of generation snowflake or that middle class lefties are just champagne socialists or that remainers aren't patriotic enough.....doubt it though.

 

If people assume that because they voted Brexit or for Trump that people view them as racist then maybe their the ones that are snowflakes. 

 

As for all the FACTS about polls, funny how most dismiss them when its not in their favour but are quite happy to post them when they are.

 

And here's the proof of that statement, there was a poll that stated 70% on 18-34 year olds put immigration BOTTOM of a list of 22 different concerns.  We call all find polls to back up our point, so what good are they when trying to prove a point?

 

Reality is both the left and the right are stuck in these polarizing myths unable to see past them, and that's the real problem.

Well what do you post that contradicts your own view? It’s all very well complaining that we only post things that support our viewpoint but I don’t see you or anyone else breaking the mould.

[Innovindil]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45875599

 

New figures for wage growth. Highest for almost 10 years. 

[Alf Bentley]

2 hours ago, purpleronnie said:

Funny how people who write these or post these only tend to do it to try and defend their own view yet do it under the pretence of creating a balanced view.

 

But maybe they'll also write or post about the 'myth' of generation snowflake or that middle class lefties are just champagne socialists or that remainers aren't patriotic enough.....doubt it though.

 

If people assume that because they voted Brexit or for Trump that people view them as racist then maybe their the ones that are snowflakes. 

 

As for all the FACTS about polls, funny how most dismiss them when its not in their favour but are quite happy to post them when they are.

 

And here's the proof of that statement, there was a poll that stated 70% on 18-34 year olds put immigration BOTTOM of a list of 22 different concerns.  We call all find polls to back up our point, so what good are they when trying to prove a point?

 

Reality is both the left and the right are stuck in these polarizing myths unable to see past them, and that's the real problem.

 

@MattP certainly displays bias at times, as we all do. But I thought this was a very balanced article and a good starting-point when trying to understand the populist upsurge.

 

I just checked the identity of the writers: 2 politics professors. Academics are as capable of bias as the rest of us, but they'd be professionally discredited if they cited evidence that lacked credibility - not the case here.

 

The article also cites stats that don't necessarily support how the wilder elements on either side like to present things

- The average Trump voter earned significantly more than the median wage ($72k !), so not typically the downtrodden poor (though he picked up some votes there)

- 1/3 of black and ethnic minority Brits voted for Brexit (that was obvious on referendum night, when Leicester only voted 51% Remain)

- 80% of under-34s with degrees voted Remain, only 37% without degrees did so....confirming the association of Higher education with Remain, but disproving the simplistic Old Brexiteers/Young Remainers  idea 

 

It also highlights differences in the support for populism in different countries: e.g. big youth vote for Le Pen (high French youth unemployment a factor in that, I'd imagine).

 

The article doesn't make much of it, but I reckon there are also major differences between Trump voters and Brexit voters. It points out that 51% of those on average incomes or slightly higher voted Brexit, but other analysis suggests that (unlike with Trump) the average Brexit voter was on less than the median income. For a start, large swathes of the Tory-voting stockbroker/commuter belt voted Remain (partly due to self-interested fears of the City shedding jobs). Among Tory-voting areas, it was less prosperous areas - and prosperous shires further from London - that voted Leave. Among Labour-voting areas, it was less prosperous areas away from the big cities/university towns (ex-industrial towns etc.).

 

The article hints at alienation from the "elite" who run society and politics as one reason for the growth of populism & a sense of powerlessness. I'm sure that's part of the explanation. Though I think a lot of people are going to get a shock when they realise that, however nice a life the annoying "liberal elite" might have and however flawed the EU might be, society is actually run in the interests of global capitalism, not of Junker/Tusk or Corbyn, Lily Allen & Lineker. 

 

Cynicism about politicians is a part of it, too. New Labour bear some heavy responsibility here. Tory politicians are just as bad when it comes to telling people what they want to hear (lower taxes, better public services, austerity is over etc.). But it was Blair, Brown and Mandelson who turned media manipulation and bullshitting of the public into an art form.

 

I'm sure that the triangular relationship between austerity, material expectations and rising inequality contributes to populism, too. An awful lot of people struggle to get by. Even if they can afford the basics, they have children, adverts, acquaintances and the Internet telling them that there's a whole lot of other stuff that they should be getting but struggle to afford.....meanwhile they see other people apparently doing better than them or hear that they are, be that information true or false and be it celebrities in the media or immigrants around the corner.

 

Maybe, too, in most cases, the human brain struggles to cope with too much change too quickly - whether that's rapid change in the racial make-up of your town or having to change job more often - or fearing that prospect. If so, then populism could yet rise a lot more unless solutions are found. Because, in the absence of a surge in the birth-rate and the world's biggest ever retraining project, we're going to continue to need a lot of immigrant labour. And, in the absence of social forces or governments able to exert strong influence on global capitalism (unlikely at UK level - not powerful enough), capital will continue to demand ever more flexible labour....equating to ever more change and instability.... We need a world where capital exists to serve humanity, not where humanity exists to serve capital!

 

Diffuse rant over!

[leicsmac]

4 hours ago, Strokes said:

Well what do you post that contradicts your own view? It’s all very well complaining that we only post things that support our viewpoint but I don’t see you or anyone else breaking the mould.

 

1 hour ago, Alf Bentley said:

 

@MattP certainly displays bias at times, as we all do. But I thought this was a very balanced article and a good starting-point when trying to understand the populist upsurge.

 

I just checked the identity of the writers: 2 politics professors. Academics are as capable of bias as the rest of us, but they'd be professionally discredited if they cited evidence that lacked credibility - not the case here.

 

The article also cites stats that don't necessarily support how the wilder elements on either side like to present things

- The average Trump voter earned significantly more than the median wage ($72k !), so not typically the downtrodden poor (though he picked up some votes there)

- 1/3 of black and ethnic minority Brits voted for Brexit (that was obvious on referendum night, when Leicester only voted 51% Remain)

- 80% of under-34s with degrees voted Remain, only 37% without degrees did so....confirming the association of Higher education with Remain, but disproving the simplistic Old Brexiteers/Young Remainers  idea 

 

It also highlights differences in the support for populism in different countries: e.g. big youth vote for Le Pen (high French youth unemployment a factor in that, I'd imagine).

 

The article doesn't make much of it, but I reckon there are also major differences between Trump voters and Brexit voters. It points out that 51% of those on average incomes or slightly higher voted Brexit, but other analysis suggests that (unlike with Trump) the average Brexit voter was on less than the median income. For a start, large swathes of the Tory-voting stockbroker/commuter belt voted Remain (partly due to self-interested fears of the City shedding jobs). Among Tory-voting areas, it was less prosperous areas - and prosperous shires further from London - that voted Leave. Among Labour-voting areas, it was less prosperous areas away from the big cities/university towns (ex-industrial towns etc.).

 

The article hints at alienation from the "elite" who run society and politics as one reason for the growth of populism & a sense of powerlessness. I'm sure that's part of the explanation. Though I think a lot of people are going to get a shock when they realise that, however nice a life the annoying "liberal elite" might have and however flawed the EU might be, society is actually run in the interests of global capitalism, not of Junker/Tusk or Corbyn, Lily Allen & Lineker. 

 

Cynicism about politicians is a part of it, too. New Labour bear some heavy responsibility here. Tory politicians are just as bad when it comes to telling people what they want to hear (lower taxes, better public services, austerity is over etc.). But it was Blair, Brown and Mandelson who turned media manipulation and bullshitting of the public into an art form.

 

I'm sure that the triangular relationship between austerity, material expectations and rising inequality contributes to populism, too. An awful lot of people struggle to get by. Even if they can afford the basics, they have children, adverts, acquaintances and the Internet telling them that there's a whole lot of other stuff that they should be getting but struggle to afford.....meanwhile they see other people apparently doing better than them or hear that they are, be that information true or false and be it celebrities in the media or immigrants around the corner.

 

Maybe, too, in most cases, the human brain struggles to cope with too much change too quickly - whether that's rapid change in the racial make-up of your town or having to change job more often - or fearing that prospect. If so, then populism could yet rise a lot more unless solutions are found. Because, in the absence of a surge in the birth-rate and the world's biggest ever retraining project, we're going to continue to need a lot of immigrant labour. And, in the absence of social forces or governments able to exert strong influence on global capitalism (unlikely at UK level - not powerful enough), capital will continue to demand ever more flexible labour....equating to ever more change and instability.... We need a world where capital exists to serve humanity, not where humanity exists to serve capital!

 

Diffuse rant over!

Again, I can see why people are turning to populism now and that article is a good summarisation, but I do feel it's aiming specifically at an easy target by describing the sentiment and not then saying where they think such sentiment might lead.

[Strokes]

1 minute ago, leicsmac said:

 

Again, I can see why people are turning to populism now and that article is a good summarisation, but I do feel it's aiming specifically at an easy target by describing the sentiment and not then saying where they think such sentiment might lead.

I don’t think it’s fair on that piece to ask for a forecast, it has attempted to stay as neutral as possible and in forecasts it’s almost impossible not to show bias when talking about future politics. Unless you are thinking economically? I mean populism isn’t even defined politics, it feeds on the negatives and promises to fix them. So even country to country, region to region the political impact and intent could be so different.

[leicsmac]

4 minutes ago, Strokes said:

I don’t think it’s fair on that piece to ask for a forecast, it has attempted to stay as neutral as possible and in forecasts it’s almost impossible not to show bias when talking about future politics. Unless you are thinking economically? I mean populism isn’t even defined politics, it feeds on the negatives and promises to fix them. So even country to country, region to region the political impact and intent could be so different.

1

Which is why I'm assuming they haven't done it.

 

I can see why they wouldn't want to open that particular can of worms, but IMO presenting a POV on such a political issue usually comes hand in hand with showing your own opinion on it - and goodness knows there's enough historical recording to make at least some predictions about populism and its effects.

 

If a writer wants to stick to quality factual presentation sans controversy, there's always physics (most of the time :D).

[Strokes]

5 hours ago, leicsmac said:

Which is why I'm assuming they haven't done it.

 

I can see why they wouldn't want to open that particular can of worms, but IMO presenting a POV on such a political issue usually comes hand in hand with showing your own opinion on it - and goodness knows there's enough historical recording to make at least some predictions about populism and its effects.

 

If a writer wants to stick to quality factual presentation sans controversy, there's always physics (most of the time :D).

I really don’t think the article was missing a stab in the dark about the future Mac. Honestly I think it would have seriously undermined it.

[leicsmac]

6 hours ago, Strokes said:

I really don’t think the article was missing a stab in the dark about the future Mac. Honestly I think it would have seriously undermined it.

Fair enough - like I said I think they're taking an easy option by just stating the reasons here and not extrapolating further but I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree at this point.

[Innovindil]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45886791

 

Inflation lower than "expected". 

[Strokes]

5 minutes ago, Innovindil said:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45886791

 

Inflation lower than "expected". 

Bloody tories!

[Innovindil]

Just now, Strokes said:

Bloody tories!

Really does look like a perfect set of results right now. Wages rising, inflation falling, hopefully they both level off near to where they are now, then the BoE can slowly nudge up interest rates over a number of years, somewhat controlling the housing cost increase. 

 

This is of course if brexit doesn't kill us. 

[Strokes]

27 minutes ago, Innovindil said:

Really does look like a perfect set of results right now. Wages rising, inflation falling, hopefully they both level off near to where they are now, then the BoE can slowly nudge up interest rates over a number of years, somewhat controlling the housing cost increase. 

 

This is of course if brexit doesn't kill us. 

Interest rates need to stay low until April 2019, I’ll be on a 5 year fixed then and they can what they like for these next five years 

[fuchsntf]

On 16/10/2018 at 10:12, Strokes said:

Well what do you post that contradicts your own view? It’s all very well complaining that we only post things that support our viewpoint but I don’t see you or anyone else breaking the mould.

I never post anything..from 3rd parties to prove a point...stop!!

Strength of character is enough...

I don't have to  use other people's arguments my own are so brilliant and uncannyily always proven right,that Sherlock Holmes,and Marrihati,

gave up by the 4th book because they just couldnt compete with my total genius.

being conceited is my total strength.I only come on here to amuse myself with the drivel from all you minions....

 

 

[Strokes]

43 minutes ago, fuchsntf said:

I never post anything..from 3rd parties to prove a point...stop!!

Strength of character is enough...

I don't have to  use other people's arguments my own are so brilliant and uncannyily always proven right,that Sherlock Holmes,and Marrihati,

gave up by the 4th book because they just couldnt compete with my total genius.

being conceited is my total strength.I only come on here to amuse myself with the drivel from all you minions....

 

 

There is a fine line between genius and madness........  

[davieG]

On 27/09/2018 at 16:25, lifted*fox said:

so to be clear - you think putting 3 ordinary men who took a non-violent stand against fracking - a practice detrimental to the long-term health / existence of the planet - in prison; at the cost of the tax-payer for 15+ months is the right thing to do?

 

a sentence that basically sends out the message that the government has made it's mind up that it's going to push forward with harmful practises for nothing other than greed and that should anyone dare speak out or stand against it they will be silenced, shut-down and put in prison? 

 

what do ordinary people like you get from siding with the state on something like that? in my opinion it's akin to literally laying down and letting the man walk all over you. and for what? you get to die and say you lived your entire life by the book? 

Been released and never should have been jailed according to the Chief Justice 

 

Three men jailed for a fracking site protest have been freed after judges ruled their sentences were "excessive".

Simon Blevins, Richard Roberts and Rich Loizou became the first UK anti-fracking protesters to be sent to prison, after climbing lorries at Cuadrilla's Lancashire site.

Court of Appeal judges ruled they should not have been jailed and imposed conditional discharges.

The judgement was met by applause and singing from supporters in the court.

A complaint against the original sentencing judge, the details of which are unknown, is being investigated.

Speaking outside HMP Preston, shortly after his release, Loizou said the court's decision "affirmed that when people peacefully break the law out of a moral obligation to prevent the expansion of fossil fuel industries, they should not be sent to prison".

[fuchsntf]

29 minutes ago, Strokes said:

There is a fine line between genius and madness........  

I am a mad genius....simples..

 

@Strokes  hi there..haven't heard from you for awhile...hope everything is ok!!

Edited 17 October 2018 by fuchsntf

[Nick]

I’ve had no time recently until today to trawl through media reports but having done so I’m struggling to see in relation to Brexit any other outcome than both sides agreeing more time. I just don’t see any satisfactory reality for either side in a no deal scenario.

 

Am I missing something big or do others kinda think we are heading this way?

[Innovindil]

6 hours ago, Swan Lesta said:

I’ve had no time recently until today to trawl through media reports but having done so I’m struggling to see in relation to Brexit any other outcome than both sides agreeing more time. I just don’t see any satisfactory reality for either side in a no deal scenario.

 

Am I missing something big or do others kinda think we are heading this way?

Wouldn't be surprised, but not sure what it would accomplish, the problems over the Irish boarder were there 2 years ago, they're there today, and I'd expect them to still be there in the future. What does more time actually solve?